In a surprise
move, the North Koreans gave the U.S. president what
some believe is his second major achievement in his
administration’s campaign against the proliferation of
nuclear weapons.
After
having convinced Libya
to dismantle its nuclear weapons program in 2003, North
Korea, after many years of negotiations, has now also
decided to come clean about its nuclear program. Under a
new deal, Pyongyang will now declare its plutonium-based
materials and facilities, something which it has hidden
for many years.
To
demonstrate their goodwill, the North Korean
authorities, publicly and dramatically blew up the
cooling tower of their nuclear facility in Yungbyon.
This was to show that the site which many have suspected
of producing weapons-grade plutonium, will no longer be
active, as per Pyongyang’s promise. In return, the U.S.
will remove the country from its Trading with the Enemy
Act and State Sponsors of Terrorism list in the next
forty-five days.
Despite
the achievement, the recent deal has its critics.
According to some experts, the North Koreans have not
declared their secret uranium enrichment facilities.
They have also not divulged details about their previous
proliferation activities in places such as Syria. These
criticisms have some justification. But overall, the
deal can be considered a success: the international
community, using diplomacy, has managed to freeze an
important part of North Korea’s nuclear program. This is
something which many thought
impossible.
So far,
the Bush administration has repeatedly failed to curb
Iran’s nuclear program. In light of recent events, the
unavoidable question leaps to mind: Can the same methods
applied to the North Korean model be used in dealing
with Iran’s?
Currently, the answer is no.
Why?
First
and foremost, the stance taken by the international
community against North Korea was far more united than
the one currently being taken against Iran. The North
Koreans were told from the beginning that only one group
of countries will negotiate with them: no on else.
Dubbed the “six
party talks,” the countries involved were China,
U.S., Russia, Japan, and South Korea.
This is not the
case with Iran. Sadly, there is no prospect for the
formation of a united international stance against
Tehran’s nuclear program. There are many different
entities trying to negotiate separately with Tehran,
including the Russians,
the Chinese, the EU, and the IAEA. This scatter-gun
approach reduces the impact which the six-party talks
produced against North Korea. Also, it allows Tehran to
play one side against another, thus giving Iran more
power and playing for time to progress with their
nuclear program even as they
negotiate.
There
is also the question of political leverage. North Korea
has no allies in any of the countries where the West,
especially the U.S., has an interest. The same cannot be
said about Iran. Tehran has strong influence in places
such as Iraq, Lebanon, and Afghanistan, all of which are
important to Washington. In fact, in each of these
countries, Iran’s influence is increasing at the expense
of America’s power.
This is
coupled with the major question of economic leverage.
North Korea is a hermit state, with little heavy
industry, and a receding agricultural capability. Its
only viable export is defense products, which it sells
to countries like Syria and Libya. The international
economic system can live without North Korean goods and
raw materials.
The
same obviously cannot be said about Iran, which has oil,
which the West badly needs. In addition, isolating Iran
economically is far more difficult than isolating North
Korea, as Iran is surrounded by countries who depend on
cross-border trade with it. This is especially true of
Iraq, whose reconstruction,
something for which the U.S. is working, depends on raw
materials and funds from Iran. This is particularly true
about Shiite areas where Washington has less
power.
And
yet, some lessons can be learned from the North Korean
experiences.
Despite
its shortfalls, the recent agreement with North Korea
shows that the combination of carrots and sticks, and
strong and united diplomacy, can work under certain
circumstances. At a minimum, the international community
should at least try to form a united stance against
Tehran, as it did against Pyongyang.
The
recent achievement in North Korea also shows that the
current U.S. stance of refusing to talk directly with
Iran is not necessarily the best strategy. When it comes
to diplomatic efforts to solve the Iranian issue
Washington should stop becoming a spectator and instead
join the process, as it successfully did with
Pyongyang.
For
now, the picture looks grim. Not only is the Iranian
government not interested in showing any sort of
compromise, and if you believe the recent article
in New
Yorker
magazine, it also seems
that Washington is still pursuing a policy of promoting
regime change in Iran.
The
U.S. should not repeat the mistakes in diplomacy it made
in Iraq. Instead, it should learn from and try to repeat
its recent North Korean
accomplishment.