Is Hezbollah about to attack Israel?



Is Hezbollah about to attack Israel?

By: Meir Javedanfar

15/04/2005

Introduction

The level of Hezbollah activity in Lebanon and on Israel's northern border has increased recently. This week Hezbollah flew its Unmanned Air Vehicle for the second successful time over Israel's airspace. The Foreign Minister of Iran, a major Hezbollah ally visited Damascus which is another major Hezbollah backer yesterday 14th of April. What has made the visit unusual is that this is his second visit in as much as 10 days to Damascus. Even more mystifying is the fact that the stated goal of his trip is to convey a message from Iran's President Khatami to President Bashar of Syria, when in fact the two met only 6 days in ago at the Pope's funeral. Added to that are the unconfirmed reports pointing to the unusual discovery of missiles in Southern Lebanon by the Lebanese Army.

Taking the aforementioned factors into consideration the immediate question is “Is Hezbollah about to attack Israel?” The following meepas analysis aims to answer this question. This will be done through the analysis of Hezbollah's current standing in Lebanon and how this may translate into the Shiite organisation entering into armed confrontation against Israel.

Domestic Developments

The last few months have been quite challenging for Hezbollah. Its troubles first started by international calls for the disarmament of the organisation and complete withdrawal of its Syrian allies from Lebanon under UN resolution 1559. This was followed by an outburst of anti-Syrian feeling in Lebanon after the assassination of the ex-prime minister Hariri . Soon after calls for Syria's withdrawal, some in Lebanon even started talking about the disarmament of Hezbollah, a subject which was taboo five years ago. However through some serious internal bargaining and brinkmanship Hezbollah managed to convince those opposed that its armed militia are to remain intact.

Despite Hezbollah's success in keeping its armed militia, its leadership have realised during the past few months that the organisation does not enjoy the same level of broad political support in Lebanon which it did five years ago. This is partly due to the fact that according to UN resolution 425, Israel is no longer occupying Lebanese land. Although Hezbollah claims that the Israeli occupied Sheeba farms are Lebanese territory, the UN publicly disputed this by calling it Israeli occupied Syrian territory.

The fight against Israel was one of the main justifications used by the organisation to have a standing army whilst it provided Hezbollah with popularity in Lebanon and in the Arab world. A major part of this justification was taken away when Israel withdrew from Lebanese territory five years ago. To make matter more difficult, Syria which was one the main political and military allies of Hezbollah is being forced to withdraw from Lebanon. Without the backing of Syria Hezbollah will find it more difficult to operate in Lebanon, both politically and militarily. The fact that Hezbollah's leadership openly sided with Syria in the recent anti-Syrian crisis also reduced Hezbollah's popularity in Lebanon as it was seen as siding with on foreign occupier (Syria) whilst talks about expelling another (Israel).

Therefore as far as the Hezbollah leadership are concerned, something needs to be done to re-instate Hezbollah's political and military standing whilst preferably keeping the Syrians in Lebanon. Such a strategy requires a common denominator. The search for common denominator will involve the following questions: Which is the one issue that justifies or even increases Syria and Hezbollah's military and political standing in Lebanon? Which is the one issue that increases the popularity of Syria and Hezbollah in the Arab street? The answer is military confrontation against the state of Israel.

However the current political situation in Lebanon does not allow Hezbollah to just pick up the nearest Katyusha and fire it at Israel. Such a move would be seen as being too provocative and it would make Hezbollah look like the aggressor. Therefore Hezbollah needs a strategy that provokes Israel to act, thus making the Jewish state look like the antagonist. Furthermore as with any skilful strategist timing is also an important element to consider. The timing for the provocation has to be when Israel is at its most vulnerable. It also has to be when there is domestic dissent in Lebanon, as domestic instability allows more room for action and manoeuvrability than a stable government in charge.

Upon close examination of current political events in Israel and Lebanon, it is the opinion of meepas that Hezbollah is most likely to launch an attack with the goal of prompting a response from Israel within the next eight week. This prognosis is based on the following hypothesis:

Withdrawal from Gaza

Ariel Sharon's withdrawal plan from Gaza is under fire from the right wing elements of his own party. The internal split in his party over the withdrawal issue has weakened Sharon's standing within Likud . Those opposed to the pullout believe that a withdrawal from Gaza is considered as a sign of Israeli weakness. This claim is also based on the argument that the Gaza withdrawal could be seen as a reward to Palestinian militants who have been attacking Israeli forces in Gaza over the last number of years. Therefore the withdrawal could in fact encourage anti – Israel militants to launch more attacks against Israel in the future.

Consequently the time period prior and during the withdrawal is the time when Ariel Sharon would not want to be seen as weak. Therefore in case of a Hezbollah attack, it is expected that Sharon will launch a major response to prove that he still maintains his tough anti-terrorism stance. Meanwhile Hezbollah can use Israel's response to justify the start of its planned cycle of violence.

Outbreak of what could be viewed in Lebanon as Israeli military aggression is very likely to serve Hezbollah's goal of increasing its political clout and justification of the need for its militia in Lebanon. This is due to the fact that in such a case Hezbollah will be seen as the defender of Lebanon as it will be in the forefront of all military operations. Furthermore the organisation's standing abroad will be boosted as it will be under the focus of global media organisations during the conflict, as was the case during the mid 1990s.

Military confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah will also serve Syria's interest. In such an eventuality Syria can state that its military absence as a deterrence force in Lebanon emboldened Israel to attack. This argument can then be used by Syria against those opposed to its military presence in Lebanon.

Instability in Lebanon

The current instability in Lebanon provides Hezbollah with an opportunity to provoke a confrontation with Israel. This is based on the view that Hezbollah finds it easier to operate in times of instability and absence of central government control in Lebanon. This is in fact true of almost any militant organisation operating in a country and can be seen in Iraq today where the instability there allows the insurgents to continue with their attacks.

The Lebanese political environment is currently an unstable one due to the inability of the different factions to agree to form a government. Furthermore there are also calls for the postponement of elections scheduled in 31 st of May. Therefore the current absence of a government supplemented with the possibility of elections being postponed provides Hezbollah with the political vacuum it needs to launch its provocative attack.

Iranian Backing

It is no secret that Hezbollah receives political and military support from Iran. The Iranian government in return has used Hezbollah's services to attack its enemies. Such services have been used in cases where the Iranian government does not want to be seen as directly involved, or has simply not had the military infrastructure to launch an attack. Previous examples include the use of Hezbollah for the assassination of Iranian dissidents in Germany in the 1990s and attacks against Jewish and Israeli targets in Argentina in 1992 and 1994.

The Iranian government is currently under political pressure from the international community for its nuclear activities. Furthermore there has also been talk of a possible military attack by Israel against its nuclear facilities. It is the view of meepas that if this happens, Iran will use the Hezbollah as its long arm of operations to punish Israel. It is also the opinion of meepas that an Iranian sponsored confrontation by Hezbollah prior to a possible Israeli attack against its nuclear installations is also likely to serve Iran's interest. This is based on the logic that the consequences of such a confrontation can be used by Tehran to remind Israel what can happen if it is aggressive towards Iran.

The aforementioned political weaknesses and problems in Israel and Lebanon provide the opportunity for the Iranian government to use Hezbollah to attack Israel as a warning. It must also be noted that Hezbollah's goals of increasing its political standing and keeping Syria in Lebanon are also to Iran's interests, thus giving more support to the arguments for a Hezbollah – Israel confrontation..

To conclude it is forecasted that Hezbollah will launch an attack against Israel. However these will be a series of small acts within the next eight weeks which will aim to provoke a major response from Israel. The recent over flights by Hezbollah's Unmanned Air Vehicles over Israel were the firing salvo in Hezbollah's plans as they intended to provoke a response from Israel and also to collect intelligence information for the upcoming planned confrontation. The exact timing of the confrontation first and foremost depends on Hezbollah's choice and second on the Israeli government's reaction to Hezbollah's forecasted provocations.

End of Analysis

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