By: M. Javedanfar

12/04/2005

The first part of this analysis by meepas looked at the background of the relationship between the new Iraqi interim President Jalal Talebani and the religious regime in Iran. The analysis determined that there has been a viable political and military relationship between the two spanning the past twenty two years.

The final part of the analysis looks at the impact this relationship will have on the Iraqi interim President's policies and attitude towards other internal Iraqi groups. It will also address the likely effect Talebani's relationship with Iran will have on his approach towards Iraq's neighbours and foreign governments who are currently involved in Iraqi politics.    

Internal Iraqi Politics

Iraqi Sunnis

The Sunni wing of the Iraqi politics is viewed as a rival against Iranian interests. This is due to their nationalistic and religious differences with the Shiite government of Iran. It is the opinion of meepas that Iran will use Talebani's influence in Iraqi politics to keep the political ambitions of the Sunnis in check. It is further envisaged that Talebani will co-operate with Iran in this matter as the Iraqi Sunnis are also seen as political rivals of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). This is due to historical Iraqi Sunni opposition to Kurdish autonomy in Iraq. Keeping the political ambitions of Iraqi Sunnis in check is also likely to enable the PUK to score points with Iraq's Shiites as they also view Sunnis as political competitors.     

Iraqi Shiites

It is the opinion of meepas that Jalal Talebani will continue with his political alliance with Shiite groups. This is due to shared concerns and commonalities between the two groups. As mentioned, both groups have an interest in keeping the political power of Iraqi Sunnis in check. Furthermore both the Kurdish minority and Shiite majority were persecuted under Saddam Hussein. They both received assistance from the Iranian government and to this day continue to enjoy good relations with Tehran. As a result their co-operation is likely to strengthen with Tehran's blessing as the Kurdish (PUK)-Shiite alliance in Iraq will doubly serve Iran's interests. Furthermore as the Shiite-PUK alliance provides them with a majority in Iraq's parliament, such a majority provides both parties with a higher chance of achieving their political goals.

Iraqi Turkmen

The Turkmen population in Iraq have always been seen as natural allies of Turkey due to their common cultural and linguistic heritage. As the PUK and Iran are both against the extension of Turkish influence in Iraq, therefore it is very likely that Jalal Talebani will work towards the reduction of the political power and influence of Iraqi Turkmen.

Iraqi Assyrians

The PUK's relationship with Iraq's Assyrian population has been amicable. The Assyrian population of Iraq is relatively small and it does not have a strong political affiliation with any specific foreign government. Therefore Talebani's attitude towards this group will be a constructive one, with the goal of including them in his future alliances. This is further strengthened by the fact that majority of Assyrians live in north of Iraq which is also Kurdish populated.

Foreign Governments and Organisations

Turkey

Both Iran and the PUK share the same suspicions and opposition against Turkish involvement in Iraqi politics. As a result Talebani is expected to ensure that Turkey remains on the outside of the Iraqi political arena. This will be done by forming alliances with other Iraqi groups in the Iraqi parliament. It should be noted that in case, the Shiites and the Sunnis share the same view as the PUK.

Iranian Kurds

This is one of the most sensitive and perhaps difficult areas for Talebani to manoeuvre. Talebani considers himself the symbol of Kurdish struggle for self rule, yet he has to be careful when it comes to supporting the same rights for Iran's Kurdish population. This is due to Iran's fierce opposition to any talk of autonomy for Iran's Kurdish population. It is the opinion of meepas that at this stage it is very unlikely that Talebani will turn his back against his Iranian allies by supporting Iran's Kurdish militants as it would be a costly political move. Assisting calls for the independence of Iran's Kurdistan is also unlikely to get US backing. This is because any US supported plan for the disintegration of Iran will reduce the impact of US efforts to garner support amongst Iran's population.   Therefore we are unlikely to see political or military support provided by Talebani or his US allies to those calling for autonomy in Iran's Kurdistan province.

Iranian Anti Government MKO (Mujahidin Khalq) movement

There are still thousands of MKO fighters trapped inside camp Ashraf in Iraq. The Iranian government is vehemently opposed to this group, and so are Iraqi Shiites who fought alongside Iran against Saddam and MKO forces during the eight year Iraq-Iran war. The US is also against the MKO as it assisted the Ayatollah's Hezbollah militants in taking over the US embassy in Tehran in 1980 (it should be noted that the MKO initially co-operated with Iranian revolutionaries against the Shah). This is notwithstanding the MKO's attacks against American personnel stationed in Iran during the reign of the Shah.

This is one area where the Iranian government stands to gain immediate benefits from its relationship with Talebani as it is expected that the PUK will support Iran's calls for the removal of the MKO from Iraq. This is due to the fact that the MKO is viewed as a threat by other Iraqi groups such as the Shiite Iraqi United Alliance. The dissolution of the MKO is also likely to have America's backing as it equally opposes the organisation. Therefore by removing the expendable MKO from Iraq Talebani will score points with the US, the Shiites and with Iran by one move, thus making the probabilities for this eventuality very high.

The US

It is envisaged by meepas that Talebani will continue to act as a mediator between the US and Iran as this role elevates Talebani's importance with both parties. However Talebani's relations with the US is likely to raise a number of stumbling blocks in his relationship with Iran as it is very unlikely that Talebani will be able to fulfil Iranian ambitions to reduce the role of the US in Iraqi politics. Talebani's inability to do this stems from the fact that the PUK was able to defeat Saddam's forces only with US assistance. Furthermore US recognition of Kurdish self autonomy was a significant boost for the PUK as it enabled the organisation to overcome obstacles placed by those opposed to the idea. Therefore it is extremely unlikely that the PUK will start to oppose the US as it will undermine its own plans and ambitions for post war Iraq.  

Israel

Immediately after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 it was rumoured that Israel's Mossad secret agents were infiltrating the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq. Iran would be opposed to any Israeli intervention in Iraq due to its ideological opposition against Israel. Although Talebani's rival Barzani is more known for his pro-Israel sympathies (in 2003 Barzani stated to a Turkish newspaper that Israel's existence is a fact and is accepted by Arab countries), nevertheless Talebani is not viewed as being sympathetic to Israel. This is due to Israel's military alliance with Turkey whom the PUK views as a threat. Furthermore any Israeli involvement in Iraq is certain to raise the ire of majority of Iraqis. Therefore not wishing to go against the mainstream Iraqi opinion, the interests of his own party, and those of his Iranian allies, it is thus likely that Talebani will ensure that Israel is kept out of Iraqi politics and territory.

Kuwait and Saudi Arabia

The political assistance and support provided by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait assist   Iraq's diplomatic progress and standing in the region and in the Arab world. Furthermore the economic assistance provided by both countries (especially from Kuwait which is one of the largest Arab donor countries to the Iraq reconstruction fund) assists Iraq's efforts to rebuild its economy. Both issues are to the interest of all Iraqi political parties, including the PUK. Therefore Talebani will support the fostering of Iraq's relationship with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The justification for this hypothesis is further backed by the fact that the current Kuwaiti Saudi relationship with Iraq does not pose a threat to Iran's interests in Iraq. Furthermore accepting political and economic assistance from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait whilst fostering amicable relations with them will enable Talebani to counter claims of under-representation by Iraq's Sunni political factions. This is due to the fact that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are both Sunni countries.   

In conclusion Talebani's relationship with the Iranian government will have an impact on PUK's relationship with both internal and external parties in Iraq. The short and medium term prognosis for the continuation of this relationship is positive. The long term prognosis is also optimistic although that depends on changes in the region and in the domestic Iraqi political arena.    

End of Analysis

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