Part 2 - Protecting Iran's Eastern and Western Flanks

By: Meir Javedanfar

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Introduction

The Iranian government of Ayatollah Khamenei is concerned about a possible US or Israeli lead military attack against Iran's nuclear facilities. Such an attack by foreign forces against Iran's territory would not be the first time. In 1980 and 1987 the US attacked Iranian territory in retaliation for Iran's militant anti-US activities. Meanwhile Israel is also considered as a serious danger to Iran's nuclear program.

Being aware of such threats, the Iranian government has applied a hybrid defensive strategy to protect the country's southern, western and eastern flanks, as they are seen as the likeliest directions from which an attack could take place.

This analysis aims to address the defensive strategies applied by the Iranian government. Part 1 of this analysis, released on 13/04/05 addressed Iran's defensive strategies for the protection of its southern flank. This analysis will address Iran's defensive strategies for the protection of its eastern and western flanks.

Eastern Flank - Afghanistan

The presence of the sizable US military contingent in Afghanistan, and the close political and military relations between the Afghan government of Hamed Karzai and Washington all raise the possibility of US forces in Afghanistan being used to attack Iran's nuclear installations. This is a real threat as Iranian nuclear installations of Natanz and Bushehr are 1000 Kilometres away from the Afghan border and thus well within the reach of US fighter aircraft or special forces stationed there. Furthermore the Iran – Afghanistan border is known for its fluidity where many drug and human smugglers have been successfully operating for decades. The danger for Tehran is that this border can be used as a springboard to insert US Special Forces into Iran.

According to reports, Iran's military defensive strategy in this area has included bolstering the size of its border police (known as the Gendarmerie) and the Revolutionary Guards. Air patrol sorties over the border have also increased to monitor border crossings.  

Another defensive strategy applied by Tehran has been invested efforts in the improvement of political relations with the Afghan government of Hamed Karzai. The goal of this strategy is to dissuade him from supporting a US launched attack from Afghan soil. The culmination of such efforts was the successful visit of Iran's President Khatami to Afghanistan in August 2002, during which Iran pledged $50 million worth of aid to the Afghan reconstruction efforts.

Another example of current Iranian approach in this area is Iran's use of its influence with Afghanistan's Shiite Farsi speaking tribes. So far the Iranian government has urged such groups to join the Afghan government's economic and political reform program. This assistance has been positively noted by the Afghan government, as convincing Afghanistan's disparate national and religious tribes to join the government's economic and reform programs has so far been a challenge.

Such crucial assistance from Iran is likely to influence any future decision taken by the Afghan government which may have a negative impact on its relations with Iran. Allowing the US to use Afghan soil to launch an attack against Iran can certainly be expected to cast a dark shadow over Afghan – Iran relations, the consequences of which the Afghan government of Hamed Karzai may find difficult to afford.  

Western Flank - Israel

Situated 1500 kilometres west of Iran's nuclear installations at Natanz and 1800 kilometres west of its nuclear installations at Bushehr is the state of Israel. The Iranian government considers Israel as its enemy. So much so that during a speech in 1999 President Rafsanjani stated that if a nuclear capability is obtained by Iran it may be used against Israel. Tehran knows that Jerusalem is taking such threats very seriously. Iran also knows that the government of Israel is unwilling to see the Iranian government become equipped with nuclear capability, as for the last 25 years the regime in Tehran has been calling for all Muslims to eliminate Israel.  

Iranian concerns about a possible Israeli attack arise from Israel's history and experience in long range military operations thousands of miles away from its borders. Such capability was further boosted by Israel's Air Force in late 1990s with the purchase of the long range F-15I fighter bombers. The newly acquired Dolphin submarines for the Israeli Navy would also be able to launch an attack with their missiles if they manage to sneak in to the waters of the Arabian Sea or even closer into the Persian Gulf.   

Not being equipped with the technology to effectively defend against such an attack, the Iranian government has instead embarked on an offensive strategy as a form of alternative defence. Subsequently Iran's defensive military strategy against Israel has included the development of Iran's long range missile capability. Iran is now equipped with the Shahab 3 missile. This missile has an operational range of 1000 kilometres which means that if launched from Iran's western borders it can reach Israel. Noting Israel's Arrow anti-missile system, the Iranian government has decided that chances of success for a missile attack against Israel would be higher if missiles from Iran are launched in great numbers. As a result production of the Shahab 3 missile has recently been stepped up.

Other Iranian defensive military strategies include strengthening its military co-operation with anti Israeli militant groups in the Middle East region. An example of this strategy includes the provision of Iran's short range “Fajr” missiles to the Hezbollah in the late 1990s. It must be noted that the “Fajr” has a longer range and bigger explosive payload that Hezbollah's Katyusha missiles.

The provision of such military capability to an arch enemy of Israel is part of Iranian government efforts to deter an attack by Israel against Iran. As Hezbollah is an ally of Iran, the deployment of the Fajr missiles was a message to Israel that in case of an attack against Iran, Tehran will be able to retaliate through Hezbollah by wreaking havoc on Israel's northern towns and borders. Furthermore Iran's close military relations with other militant groups such as Hamas and Jihad Islami are also expected to act as deterrence against a possible Israeli attack. This is due to the fact that such groups have in the past proven themselves to be very capable of attacking Israel's civilian population.

Iran's defensive strategy against Israel also has political elements. Throughout the years Iran has also developed a strong political relationship with militant groups such as Hamas and Jihad Islami. Therefore it is a known fact that Tehran holds sway over the political strategy of the aforementioned groups. Tehran knows that the cooperation of such groups is crucial in any ceasefire agreement between the Palestinian Authority and Israel, and for implementation of security reforms by the Palestinian Authority. Such influence is used by Iran to discourage potential Israeli hostilities against Iran, as an Iranian retaliation through extremist Palestinian groups can have far reaching negative consequences on Israel's security.

Western Flank – Iraq

Saddam Hussein was a sworn enemy of Iran and as a result invaded the country in 1980. Although he was removed in 2003, Iran is still concerned about a military attack from its neighbour to the west. However this time an attack is envisaged by America 's massive military contingency in Iraq as the Iranian government is well aware of America 's hostility towards its nuclear program. The threat perception is augmented by the fact that Iran's nuclear installations are within 800 kilometres of the Iraqi border thus putting them well with the range of US fighter aircraft based there.

Military measures taken by Iran against such an attack include strengthening of Iran's conventional forces on the border with Iraq. This includes increase in the number of soldiers, aircraft, missiles and navy frigates in the Persian Gulf. Furthermore the 10,000 or so Iraqi Shiites soldiers who fought alongside Iran against Saddam Hussein are now back in Iraq and can be used as a retaliatory force against American interests. Reports of Iranian assistance to other Iraqi insurgents also signals further Iranian military influence in Iraq which can be used by the government in Tehran to punish America in case of an attack.

Iran's political influence with Iraqi Shiites is another defensive strategy applied by the Iranian government. It is a known fact that Tehran has influence over moderate Iraqi Shiites (headed by the Iranian born Ayatollah Sistani) and hard line Iraqi Shiites (headed by Ayatollah M uqtada Al Sadr ). The Iranian government is aware of the fact that co-operation of such groups is crucial for America 's plans for democracy in Iraq. Simply because Shiites form the majority of Iraq's population. As a result the Iranian government's influence with the Shiite groups is and can be used by Iran to reward or punish US policy and actions. The potential impact of this Iranian defensive strategy can be envisaged by estimating the massive political and military costs to the US caused by an Iran lead Shiite military uprising against American forces in Iraq.

In conclusion, the Iranian government is taking all measures possible to defend its nuclear program. This is due to important historic, religious, cultural, political, economic and strategic motivations which to the Iranian government justify the need and the right to become a nuclear power. Whether or not the Iranian government is successful in the defence of its nuclear program depends on the choice made by those who oppose it. First choice is accepting the consequences of a nuclear capable Iranian government. The second choice is accepting the consequences of an attack to eliminate the Iranian government's nuclear installations. Each option has a price attached to it. The future choice of action by US and Israel regarding Iran’s nuclear ambitions will be based on the option with the affordable price.

End of Analysis

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